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Improperly Performed Abortion as Fetal Homicide:
An Uneasy Coexistence Becomes More Difficult
Laura E. Back*
I. INTRODUCTION
The scenario is a nightmare: A woman wants to terminate a pregnancy,
and although Roe v. Wade' protects her legal right to an abortion, the
practical difficulties of obtaining one are prohibitive. In desperation she
seeks, as many women have done whenever medical abortions have been
unavailable, to induce miscarriage, and with the help of a third party, she
succeeds. Often, such nightmare scenarios end with the woman's death or
serious injury, but here she survives. Instead, it is her assistant whose life
is lost at the hands of the state's fetal homicide laws. These laws treat
killing a fetus identically to killing a live human: as a capital crime. They
seek to satisfy Roe by excluding from their reach the pregnant woman
herself and any doctor who performs a medical abortion. Despite that, a
teenager who assists his girlfriend in a desperate situation is treated
identically to a third-party assailant.
This may not be a hypothetical situation. In a recent Texas case, a
defendant convicted of fetal homicide claimed precisely these facts, with
the corroboration of the pregnant woman. In June 2005, Gerardo Flores, a
19-year-old from Lufkin, Texas, was convicted of two counts of homicide
for killing the fetuses carried by his girlfriend, Erica Basoria.2 Flores was
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1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-166 (1973).
2. Ashley Cook, Teen Guilty of Fetal Murder, LUFKIN DAiLY NEWS June 7, 2005
[hereinafter Teen Guilty].
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sentenced to two life terms of incarceration, which was a minimum of 40
years imprisonment. 3  This sentence was enacted despite Ms. Basoria's
testimony at trial that she had wanted an abortion and that Flores had acted
to assist her.4
According to news reports of Ms. Basoria's story, she had realized
when she was four months into her pregnancy that she did not want to
continue it.5 She initially attempted to induce a miscarriage herself by
jogging against her doctor's advice, ceasing to take vitamins, and hitting
herself in the stomach.6  Ultimately, Flores helped her by repeatedly
stepping on her stomach.7 Reports suggested a variety of reasons Ms.
Basoria may have been unwilling or unable to seek a medical abortion,
including expense,8 parental opposition, 9 misinformation from her doctor,' °
and distance to the nearest abortion providers."'
Mr. Flores' conviction was made possible by the Texas Prenatal
Protection Act, which took effect on September 1, 2003.12 The Act defines
the term "individual" in the Texas Penal Code to include fetuses, thereby
making them subject to the same protections that the code provides to
living persons. 13 In its application to criminal homicide, the Act provides
certain abortion-related exceptions. A pregnant woman herself cannot be
criminally charged for conduct resulting in the death of her fetus, 4 and
"homicide" is deemed to exclude "a lawful medical procedure performed
by a physician or other licensed health care provider with the requisite
consent, if the death of the unborn child was the intended result of the
procedure."'5 Ms. Basoria herself could not be charged under the statute,
but the exception protecting medical abortions did not apply to Mr. Flores.
The version of the facts presented by Mr. Flores' defense is contested.
Evidence existed that Mr. Flores had been physically abusive toward Ms.
3. Abortion in the First Degree, EYE WEEKLY, June 16, 2005,
http://www.eye.net/eye/issue/issue_06.16.05/op/editorial.html [hereinafter Eye].
4. Ashley Cook, Mom defends her boyfriend, babies' father, LUFKIN DAILY NEWS
June 3, 2005.
5. Craig Malisow, Stomped Out, HOUSTON PRESS, Apr. 28, 2005,
http://houstonpress.com/Issues/2005-04-28/news/featuresprint.html [hereinafter Stomped
Out].
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Eye, supra note 3.
9. Id.
10. Eleanor J. Bader, The Flores Case, Z MAG., Sept. 2005, at 15, available at
http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Sep2005/bader0905.html.
11. The Houston Press reports that the nearest abortion providers to Lufkin are in
Houston and Bryan. Stomped Out, supra note 5. The distance to each of these cities from
Lufkin is over 100 miles.
12. Prenatal Protection Act, ch. 822, § 1.01, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 2607.
13. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon 2006).
14. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06(1) (Vernon 2006).
15. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06(2) (Vernon 2006).
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Basoria on previous occasions,1 6 which suggests that her miscarriage may
have resulted from a particularly brutal assault. However, no report
indicates that the jury was required to find that the facts were other than
those testified to by Mr. Flores and Ms. Basoria. As a result, whatever the
truth of what happened to Ms. Basoria, the case establishes that someone
who assists a woman in terminating a pregnancy can be charged with
murder, provided only that the narrow abortion-provider exception does not
apply.
In this paper, I explore the constitutional bases for challenging such a
result. Part II begins with background on the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence and the law of fetal homicide. As I discuss in part Il, the
principles established by abortion jurisprudence do allow the state to
prohibit non-medical abortions, but these principles can be applied in
combination with Eighth Amendment proportionality or equal protection
analysis to mitigate the harshness of the resulting sentence. However, I
conclude that what is fundamentally objectionable in this scenario can be
addressed only by a constitutional approach that recognizes the importance
of the terms in which a prohibition is phrased. I outline the basis for this
approach in part IV.
Throughout the ensuing discussion, I will occasionally make use of the
Flores case, as treated by the Texas courts, as an example. My arguments
pertain to the legal questions raised by Mr. Flores' account of his situation,
not to the factual question of that account's veracity. I do not intend to
endorse that version of the facts over any other account of what happened,
and I mean no disregard for the possibility that Ms. Basoria was in fact the
victim of a brutal assault, or for the serious problem of domestic violence
in general.17
16. See Stomped Out, supra note 5 (reporting bruises "under [Ms. Basoria's] right
eye and on her right arm, right wrist and abdomen" as well as an old bruise on her left
breast, and quoting a statement by Mr. Flores that he had previously hit Ms. Basoria, but
"always aimed for the arms").
17. The likely role of domestic violence in the Flores case has prompted its criticism
on other grounds in feminist circles. See generally, e.g., "Boyfriend Gets Life Sentence
Under 'Fetal Protection' Law," Alas, a Blog, http://www.amptoons.com/blog/archives/
2005/06/07/boyfriend-gets-life-sentence-under-fetal-protection-law/#more-1608 (June 7,
2005). If Flores was indeed guilty of a brutal assault on Ms. Basoria, what does it signify
that the law has disregarded her victimhood in favor of a focus on the fetuses she was
carrying? Posting of Kim (basement variety!) to "Boyfriend Gets Life Sentence Under
'Fetal Protection' Law," Alas, a Blog, http://www.amptoons.com/blog/archives/2005/06/07/
boyfriend-gets-life-sentence-under-fetal-protection-law/#more-1608 (June 10, 2005,
7:35pm) ("Erica Basoria is treated as a non-entity within the whole ordeal, despite it being
her body that was abused into aborting. She was simply a damaged incubator"). While I do
not take up this question here, other commentators have addressed the choice of legislatures
to focus on the interests of fetuses when prosecuting crimes against pregnant women. See
generally, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Defense of Others and Defenseless "Others", 17 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 327 (2005) (arguing that the law should emphasize the loss experienced by
the pregnant woman, rather than fetal personhood, when a fetus is harmed through violent
crime).
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II. BACKGROUND: ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE AND
FETAL PROTECTION LAWS
Roe v. Wade established that a pregnant woman has a right to choose to
terminate a pregnancy prior to fetal viability. 18 Although acknowledging
the complexity and controversy surrounding the issue, 19 it held that the
abortion decision fell within a woman's established constitutional right of
privacy.2° As such, it treated the right as "fundamental," requiring that any
infringement on it be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. 2'
Although the state argued that it had a compelling interest in protecting
prenatal life from the time of conception, 22 the Court noted that legal and
societal views on when life began varied widely.23 It held that the state
could not justify its infringement on a pregnant woman's rights "by
adopting one theory of life.",24 Instead, the Court declared viability to be
the point at which the state interest in protecting fetal life became
compelling.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Supreme Court revisited the abortion right.26 Although the Court's opinion
did not speak in terms of fundamental rights, it claimed to "reaffirm" the
"essential holding" of Roe and asserted "the right of the woman to choose
to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue
interference from the State. 27  It described the protected freedom as a
"constitutional liberty" interest.28 The Court's analysis of Roe's essential
18. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
19. See id. at 116:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional
nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even
among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that
the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to
the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes
toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's
thinking and conclusions about abortion. In addition, population growth,
pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to
simplify the problem.
20. Id. at 155.
21. Id. at 155-56.
22. Id. at 159.
23. Id. at 160-62.
24. Id. at 162.
25. Id. at 163.
26. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
27. Id. at 846.
28. Id. at 869. See also id. at 852, where the Court discusses the nature of the
woman's interest in more detail:
These considerations begin our analysis of the woman's interest in
terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it, for this reason: though the
abortion decision may originate within the zone of conscience and belief, it
is more than a philosophic exercise. Abortion is a unique act. It is an act
fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the
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holding emphasized the principle that a state has a legitimate interest "from
the outset of the pregnancy" in protecting not only the health of the
pregnant woman, but "the life of the fetus that may become a child.,
29
Nonetheless, the court concluded that prior to viability, the decision to
continue or terminate the pregnancy rests with the pregnant woman.3 °
In Casey, the Court established an "undue burden" standard to balance
a pregnant woman's protected liberty with the legitimate state interests at
stake in the abortion context. 31  Under this standard, a regulation on
abortion is invalid only if "its purpose or effect is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability." 32  Accordingly, while the pregnant woman has the right "to
make the ultimate decision," it is "not a right to be insulated from all others
in doing So. '
33
The Casey Court identified two legitimate interests which a state might
seek to advance within the undue burden framework. First, it authorized
the state to regulate pursuant to its interest in the pregnant woman's
health.34 Such regulations are valid provided they do not constitute an
undue burden.35
The second area in which the Supreme Court identified a permissible
role for state regulation was in asserting its interest in fetal life, not by
prohibiting the pregnant woman from making the choice to terminate the
pregnancy, but by seeking to inform that choice.36 This right on the state's
implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the
procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must confront the
knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short
of an act of violence against innocent human life; and, depending on one's
beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted. Though abortion is
conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all
instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense
unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who
carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to
pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning
of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in
the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be
grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too
intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own
vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the
course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives
and her place in society.
29. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
30. Id. at 872 ("[T]he woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her
pregnancy before viability ... .
31. Id. at 878.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 877.
34. Id. at 878.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 877 ("[T]he means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential
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part includes the right to express its own "profound respect for the life of
the unborn" to the pregnant woman.37 The Court elaborated:
Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules
and regulations designed to encourage [the woman] to know that
there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can
be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term
and that there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of
unwanted children as well as a certain degree of state assistance if
the mother chooses to raise the child herself.
38
Provided that mechanisms imposed by the state for this purpose do not
unduly burden the pregnant woman's right to make the ultimate decision,
the state is free to impose measures designed "to persuade the woman to
choose childbirth over abortion.
3 9
Within the context of these protections of pregnant women's rights, a
substantial body of state law exists to protect fetuses against third-party
assailants. In 1994, one state Supreme Court justice reported that at least
24 jurisdictions criminalized the killing of a fetus.4 ° Since then, the
apparent trend in the United States has been toward increasing recognition
of fetuses as potential crime victims, including enactment of the Texas
Prenatal Protection Act in 200341 and the 2004 passage of the federal
Unborn Victims of Violence Act (UVVA).42
Generally, fetal protection laws are applied against defendants who
assault pregnant women, resulting either in miscarriage or in the death of
the mother and therefore also the fetus.43 While a number of jurisdictions
define the crime of killing a fetus separately from an ordinary homicide and
apply lesser penalties,44 some jurisdictions, including Texas, treat fetuses
identically to other victims for purposes of the criminal law.45 The federal
UVVA falls in the latter category.46 Furthermore, while some jurisdictions
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it.").
37. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
38. Id. at 872.
39. Id. at 878.
40. People v. Davis, 7 Cal. 4th 797, 841 (1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
41. Michelle Haynes, Inner Turmoil: Redefining the Individual and the Conflict of
Rights Between Woman and Fetus Created by the Prenatal Protection Act, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 131, 145 (2004).
42. Sepinwall, supra note 17, at 328.
43. See, e.g., Davis, 7 Cal. 4th at 800 (mother survived gunshot wound but
miscarried); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn. 1990) (woman killed in attack
was discovered to have been pregnant with a pre-viability fetus).
44. See Davis, 7 Cal. 4th at 841-42.
45. TEX. PENAL CODE AN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon 2006) (defining "individual" for
penal code purposes as "including an unborn child").
46. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(2)(a) (West 2006) (providing that punishment for injury
or death of a fetus shall be "the same as the punishment provided under Federal law for that
conduct had that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother").
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limit protection to post-viability fetuses,47 paralleling Roe v. Wade's
assessment of when state interests in protection of potential life become
"compelling" for purposes of abortion law,48 both the Texas statute and the
UVVA apply to fetuses at any stage of development.49
Ordinarily, these laws are not deemed to be in overt conflict with the
principles established by the Court in Roe and Casey. Challenges rejected
by state courts have generally fallen into two categories: arguments that
because, under Roe, a fetus is not a person with a legally protectable
interest, fetal homicide prohibitions are in conflict with Roe, 50 and
arguments that the prohibitions violate the equal protection rights of fetal
homicide defendants by treating them differently from pregnant women or
abortion providers. 5
The Roe Court determined that since a fetus was not a person for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment's protections, it had no
constitutional right to life that must be factored into the Court's analysis of
the abortion right.52  However, state courts considering the issue have
found that Roe's holding is immaterial to statutes protecting fetuses from
third-party assailants.53 For example, the California Supreme Court has
argued that although Roe construes the scope of Fourteenth Amendment
protection to exclude the unborn, it acknowledges independent state
interests in "potential life," and it prohibits states from asserting those
interests only where doing so would violate the protected rights of another.
Because prosecution of third-party assailants generally promotes, rather
than infringes upon, the pregnant woman's interests,54 Roe would seem to
constitute no bar to a state's assertion of its own interests in fetal protection
in this context.
55
State courts have also rejected challenges of fetal protection statutes
47. Davis, 7 Cal. 4th at 841.
48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
49. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon 2005) ("every stage of gestation
from fertilization until birth"); 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (West 2006) ("a member of the species
homo sapiens, at any state of development, who is carried in the womb").
50. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 757 (1976) (finding that Roe
held that a state had no interest in protecting a fetus from abortion or murder prior to
viability). The California Supreme Court disapproved this reasoning in Davis, 7 Cal. 4th at
810.
51. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321.
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-158.
53. E.g., Davis, 7 Cal. 4th at 807.
54. The Merrill court, for example, noted that its fetal homicide statute, in protecting
the fetus's life, "protects, too, the woman's interest in her unborn child and her right to
decide whether it shall be carried in utero." Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 322.
55. Notwithstanding this conclusion, advocates of abortion rights may legitimately
fear that statutes classifying fetuses as "persons" for purposes of state law threaten Roe,
because changing legal and societal understandings of that term may make ripe for review
the Roe Court's interpretation of the term as used in the 14th Amendment. The larger
holding of that case rested on this interpretation of the 14th Amendment. See Roe, 410 U.S.
at 158.
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based on equal protection grounds. In State v. Merrill, a defendant before
the Minnesota Supreme Court argued that punishing him for killing a fetus,
when the law would have permitted the pregnant woman herself to do so,
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.56
The court rejected this argument, holding that the defendant was not
similarly situated to the pregnant woman.5 7 The distinction rested on the
fact that, while a pregnant woman seeking an abortion acts pursuant to her
own constitutionally protected interests, a third-party assailant has no like
interests implicated by a prohibition on fetal homicide.58 Furthermore, the
defendant was not similarly situated to an abortion provider who acted on
the woman's behalf and in furtherance of her constitutional rights.59 This
disposition of the equal protection issue is, of course, unpersuasive in the
consensual non-medical abortion context.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN PROHIBITING AND
PENALIZING NON-MEDICAL ABORTIONS
The essential prohibition effected by the Texas Prenatal Protection Act
in the abortion context is a provision which bans abortions outside a
medical context. In general, restricting the performance of abortions to
licensed physicians is not considered an undue burden, and thus does not
offend the Roe or Casey standard.60  The Court has upheld such a
restriction based on the state's interest in ensuring that the procedure be
performed safely, 61 even where the person banned from performing
abortions was a physician's assistant who had previously been licensed to
perform abortions in the state.62 The safety concerns can be assumed to be
substantially greater when an abortion is performed at home by someone
with no medical training whatsoever. As a result, the prohibition is even
more defensible under the circumstances of the Flores case.
In addition to asserting its interest in the woman's safety, a state
seeking to defend such a restriction may claim that prohibiting abortions
performed at home by non-licensed persons advances its interest in
exposing women to the state's persuasive machinery before they make the
decision to terminate a pregnancy. Based on the state's interest in
persuasion, the Casey court approved a requirement that a physician
provide certain information and offer the woman certain additional
materials at least 24 hours prior to the procedure.63 Texas imposes a
56. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 322.
59. "In the case of abortion, the woman's choice and the doctor's actions are based
on the woman's constitutionally protected right to privacy." Id. (emphasis added).
60. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974 (1997).
61. Id. at 974-75.
62. Id. at 970-7 1.
63. Casey, 505 U.S at 881-83.
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similar requirement on abortion providers.6  Given the state's right to
impose such requirements, it can reasonably assert that limiting the
performance of abortions to licensed providers is necessary to give effect to
its policies because of the practical impossibility of enforcing them against
individuals performing abortions at home.
Although there were genuine problems with the method of abortion
allegedly chosen by Mr. Flores and Ms. Basoria, commentators discussing
the Flores case have argued that the harshness of Mr. Flores' sentence was
unacceptable.65 The harshness of a sentence is subject to constitutional
review under the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to state sentences by
the 14th Amendment's due process clause. In the remainder of this section,
I show how the principles established by Roe and Casey can be carried over
into an Eighth Amendment analysis of a sentence like that of Mr. Flores.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits sentences which are "grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime. 66 This rule has primarily
been used to invalidate death sentences,67 but the court has recognized its
applicability to non-capital cases as well.68 The court's analysis is "guided
by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the
64. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(2) (Vernon 2006):
[T]he physician who is to perform the abortion or the physician's agent
informs the woman that:
(A) medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care,
childbirth, and neonatal care;
(B) the father is liable for assistance in the support of the child without
regard to whether the father has offered to pay for the abortion;
(C) public and private agencies provide pregnancy prevention counseling
and medical referrals for obtaining pregnancy prevention medications or
devices, including emergency contraception for victims of rape or incest;
and
(D) the woman has the right to review the printed materials described by
Section 171.014, that those materials have been provided by the Texas
Department of Health and are accessible on an Internet website sponsored by
the department, and that the materials describe the unborn child and list
agencies that offer alternatives to abortion[.]
The printed materials referred to must include "materials designed to inform
the woman of the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of
the unborn child at two-week gestational increments from the time when a
woman can be known to be pregnant to full term, including any relevant
information on the possibility of the unborn child's survival" and "color
pictures representing the development of the child at two-week gestational
increments." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.016(a)-(b)
(Vernon 2006). This information must be provided at least 24 hours prior to
the procedure. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(b)(2) (Vernon
2006).
65. Eye, supra note 3.
66. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980).
67. Id. at 272-73.
68. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288-90 (1983).
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same crime in other jurisdictions.,,69 No one of these factors is dispositive
in isolation. 70 Past cases warn that successful proportionality challenges to
non-capital sentences will be "exceedingly rare.'
Complicating the proportionality analysis is the fact that states may
base punishments on any of a variety of penological theories.72 This gives
rise to several possible approaches to the proportionality analysis. Justice
Scalia has argued for an outright rejection of any proportionality
requirement, asserting that the concept of proportionality is inherently tied
to a retributive theory of punishment, and that states must be free to pursue
penological goals apart from retribution.7 3  Elsewhere, it has been
suggested that a rule of proportionality based on retributive principles
appropriately operates as a "side constraint" on a state's application of
other penological theories.74 Under an approach to proportionality rooted
in retributive principles, the key inquiry is whether a defendant's moral
culpability is sufficient to justify subjecting the defendant to the
punishment in question.
The alternate, "disjunctive" approach to proportionality merely requires
that the harshness of the punishment be justified by any traditional
penological theory.75  This approach was used by the plurality of the
Supreme Court in its opinion in Ewing v. California.7 6 That opinion argued
that, in view of the particular state interest in preventing recidivism, a life
sentence administered under California's "three strikes" law was
reasonably related to the state's goals of incapacitation and deterrence.77
The opinion emphasized the importance of deferring to a state's legislative
policy choices.78
The traditional proportionality analysis requires that courts "judge the
gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale., 79 Among the factors
considered may be the distinction between violent and nonviolent offenses,
the "absolute magnitude" of an offense, and the defendant's mental state in
carrying out the offense.80  Where the court considers non-retributive
justifications for punishment, it seems to consider more generally the
seriousness of the state interests motivating the policy in question. In
Ewing, the plurality emphasized the magnitude of California's recidivism
69. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
70. Id. at 290n.17.
71. Id. at 289-90.
72. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003).
73. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, dissenting in part).
74. Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA.
L. REv. 677, 683 (2005).
75. Id. at 682-83.
76. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25-27.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 25.
79. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
80. Id. at 292-93.
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problem. 8' It also observed the existence of some empirical evidence
82
supporting the policy's effectiveness at achieving its aims. However, the
Court emphasized that its objective was not to second-guess the policy
choices of the California legislature by stating, "It is enough that the State
of California has a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically
enhanced sentences for habitual felons 'advance[s] the goals of [its]
criminal justice system in any substantial way.' ' 83
Against this backdrop, consider how Roe and Casey affect the way a
state like Texas could justify the application of a life sentence for an
abortion performed in an unlawful manner. Whatever penological theories
the state emphasizes, it is constrained by the fact that it cannot legitimately
aim to save the life of a non-viable fetus when the pregnant woman is
determined to end her pregnancy. The abortion decisions have made clear
that, ultimately, the power to determine the fetus' fate rests with the
pregnant woman alone.
To the extent that the state may act to promote its interest in the
potential life of the fetus, it is limited to attempts to influence the woman's
choice. As the Casey plurality emphasized, "the means chosen by the State
to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the
woman's free choice, not hinder it." 84 Estimates suggest that as a practical
matter, relatively few women who seek to terminate their pregnancies will
actually be dissuaded by the state's informed consent machinery. 85
Moreover, when a woman is so determined to end her pregnancy that she
resorts to a dangerous at-home abortion, it seems especially unlikely that
she could be easily persuaded to carry the pregnancy to term. The
significance of the state's interest in its informed consent requirements
therefore stands in sharp contrast to the interests states have asserted in
more typical fetal homicide cases.
86
81. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 26 ("Recidivism is a serious public safety concern in
California and throughout the Nation. According to a recent report, approximately 67
percent of former inmates released from state prisons were charged with at least one
,serious' new crime within three years of their release.").
82. Id. at 27 ("Four years after the passage of California's three strikes law, the
recidivism rate of parolees returned to prison for the commission of a new crime dropped by
nearly 25 percent.").
83. Id. at 28.
84. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
85. One physician, for example, has estimated that state-provided propaganda
seeking to discourage abortion may change the minds of one to three percent of women.
Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 499 F. Supp. 215, 219 (D. Mass. 1980),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 641 F.2d 1006 (1 st Cir. 1981).
86. In Merrill, for instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that not only did the
application of its fetal homicide statute not interfere with the pregnant woman's rights, the
statute actually protected her interest in continuing her pregnancy if she chose. The court
stated, "In our case, the fetal homicide statutes seek to protect the 'potentiality of human
life,' and they do so without impinging directly or indirectly on a pregnant woman's privacy
rights." Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 322.
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Furthermore, recall that the restriction under which Mr. Flores was
convicted, a restriction on who may perform abortions, does not address
directly the avoidance of informed consent procedures. At best, it
indirectly promotes the state's interest in potential life by making its
informed consent procedures easier to enforce. This further mitigates the
degree to which the state's potential life interests are promoted by the
statute. It may also mitigate the level of moral culpability associated with
the restriction. The woman's freedom to terminate her pregnancy shields
the abortion itself from moral condemnation by the law, and the
defendant's mere lack of a medical license does not itself suggest any
hostility toward or even disregard for potential life.
Finally, consider that the penalty imposed on a physician who
intentionally violates the state's informed consent requirements is a fine of
no more than $10,000 and no imprisonment.87 When a defendant indirectly
subverts this regulatory regime by performing an abortion without a
medical license, life imprisonment is a grossly disproportionate
punishment, under either a retributive or utilitarian view.
In spite of this, it must be recalled that the state has another interest in
protecting the pregnant woman's own health which may provide a basis for
regulation of abortions which is far more significant in this context. The
facts alleged in the Flores case are egregious in this regard because the
dangerousness of non-medical abortions may vary greatly with
circumstances, but one achieved by stomping on the pregnant woman's
stomach must surely be extraordinarily risky. It is suggestive of a highly
culpable level of recklessness on the part of the person performing it.
Consider how these facts compare to an ordinary criminal assault
posing a similar danger to the victim. 88 Here, Ms. Basoria allegedly asked
Mr. Flores to attack her in order to end her pregnancy which may reflect
substantially on Mr. Flores' moral culpability. A person who causes
serious harm to another out of violent motivations is quite different from
one who responds to a request for assistance under desperate
circumstances, even where a significant degree of recklessness is involved.
Neither is it clear why any utilitarian consideration would justify higher
penalties than those given for an ordinary assault. It is presumably no more
important to deter or incapacitate those who might perform dangerous
abortions than those who commit violent nonconsensual assaults. 89
Furthermore, it is improbable that the state has any basis for concluding
87. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.018 (Vernon 2006).
88. Recall again that I am addressing the facts of the Flores case as alleged by Mr.
Flores' defense, and as testified to by Ms. Basoria herself in court. It is of course possible
that the incident in question was in actuality nothing other than an ordinary criminal assault.
89. Cf Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24 (commenting that three-strikes laws "responded to
widespread public concerns about crime by targeting the class of offenders who pose the
greatest threat to public safety: career criminals").
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that an unusually harsh sentence is necessary to achieve deterrence in this
particular context. 90
Texas' penalty for aggravated assault therefore provides a ceiling on
the punishment appropriate under the facts alleged by Mr. Flores. Texas
law treats assault resulting in bodily injury as a second degree felony under
most circumstances. 91 Prison sentences for second degree felonies under
Texas law range from 2 to 20 years. 92 While a 20-year sentence may still
seem unduly harsh for performing a dangerous abortion at the woman's
request, it is substantially less than both the capital sentences that fetal
homicide prohibitions may permit, or than the two consecutive life
sentences to which Mr. Flores was sentenced.
93
The foregoing analysis suggests that even under a narrow approach to
the Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement - one which allows
for wide state discretion in determining what penological theory will
support the harshness of its punishment, and which still leaves the state
substantial latitude in drawing parallels between offenses - a fetal
homicide sentence may be impermissibly harsh. Although Texas does not
unduly burden the abortion right by requiring that a person performing an
abortion must have a medical license, proper consideration of the
fundamental right to an abortion nonetheless limits the state's ability to
impose harsh punishments for violations of that requirement.
A similar analysis could also be applied to a challenge brought under
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. As I discussed in Part
III, equal protection challenges to fetal homicide prohibitions have failed
when a third-party assailant claims to be similarly situated to a pregnant
woman or an abortion provider. However, a defendant who performs a
consensual non-medical abortion, an act legitimately prohibited by law,
may argue that he is denied equal protection by being subjected to a harsher
sentence than a defendant who undermines the same legitimate state
interests and is subjected to a lesser penalty under a charge of assault,
90. Cf Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24 (observing that those affected by three-strikes laws
were those "whose conduct has not been deterred by more conventional approaches to
punishment").
91. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (Vernon 2006).
(a) A person commits an offense if the person commits assault as defined in
§22.01 and the person:
(1) causes serious bodily injury to another, including the person's spouse; or
(2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.
(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree...
[exceptions inapplicable here].
92. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.33(a) (Vernon 2006).
93. Recall that Mr. Flores' punishment resulted from his conviction on two counts,
one for each aborted fetus. If the justification for punishment rests on the state's interest in
the woman's safety, it makes little sense to punish Mr. Flores' act twice as harshly because
Ms. Basoria was carrying twins, absent some showing that the number of fetuses involved
substantially affected the danger to her. Such a result seems improbable.
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practicing medicine without a license, or performing an abortion without
providing the required information to the pregnant woman. Here again, the
Roe and Casey standards for permissible state interests in the abortion
context limit the interests the state may claim to be serving by treating a
defendant who provides a non-medical abortion so much more harshly than
similarly situated defendants not charged with fetal homicide. Without
relying on a state interest in preventing abortion, the state may find it
difficult to justify a harsh fetal homicide sentence in a non-medical
abortion case.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LANGUAGE DEFINING THE
CRIME
The foregoing analysis addresses the inappropriate harshness of
applying fetal homicide penalties to improperly performed abortions.
However, I believe that the harshness of the penalty involved is not the
central problem with this application of fetal homicide laws. Rather, the
designation of the crime as "fetal homicide," makes a statement that is
inconsistent with the basic abortion right. Even if an appropriate penalty
were applied, conviction of a defendant for the crime of fetal homicide,
under facts like those alleged by Mr. Flores, cannot be reconciled with
Roe's essential holding that abortion is a protected right.
The problem is that applying a homicide prohibition to the facts alleged
by Mr. Flores fundamentally misstates the nature of the prohibition. It
suggests that what is primarily at issue in the crime is the death of the
fetuses. In fact, the state has no legitimate interest in preventing this when
the pregnant woman chooses to end her pregnancy. The permissibility of
the regulation hinges on its having as its central element the defendant's
lack of a medical license. Therefore, the terms of the Texas statute,
prohibiting the killing itself, appear to seek an objective which the state has
no right to seek. It relegates the provision dealing with its permissible
objective, the requirement of a medical license, to the language of a side
issue or an exception. It accurately represents the elements of the crime:
the defendant who had no medical license acted to terminate a woman's
pregnancy. However, in its structure and its choice of terms, it
misrepresents what, if it is to survive analysis under the undue burden
standard, must be its central objectives.
The difficult question that arises is whether the manner in which a state
describes a criminal prohibition is a matter for constitutional scrutiny.
Because the essential elements of the crime are discernible from the Texas
statute, it does not suffer from vagueness. However, I argue that the
misplaced emphasis nonetheless leads to a violation of the defendant's due
process rights. Consider, in this light, one news report's discussion of the
prosecutor's closing statement in Mr. Flores' trial:
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No one would ever know the potential those unborn lives could
have held, [Assistant District Attorney Art Bauereiss] said. Family
would never get to see the boys' first steps, teach them to tie their
shoes or take prom pictures. Worst of all, he said, Flores' own
children could not save themselves. "Those babies could not raise
their hands in self-defense to say, No, Daddy, no, Daddy!"
Bauereiss said, emotion nearly choking his words.
94
Such comments have no place in a prosecution for an improperly
performed abortion. They rely on the jury's sorrow over the termination of
the pregnancy, which the pregnant woman had a constitutional right to
terminate. When the legitimate state interests justifying the prohibition are
properly understood, the jury's feelings about whether the woman obtained
an abortion at all, rather than how, or by whom, the abortion was
performed, are irrelevant. In urging a conviction based on these feelings,
the prosecutor introduces improper prejudice.
By terming the crime a homicide, however, the state obscures this
issue. The law implies that the essence of the crime was in terminating the
woman's pregnancy, and it therefore encourages prosecutors and juries to
emphasize this element. In my view, this introduces an element of
unfairness sufficient to constitute a due process violation.
Nevertheless, the defendant is not the only one affected by such an
application of the law. The imposition of a criminal punishment has
significant effects on society as a whole. Justifications for criminal
punishment based on general deterrence recognize that potential
wrongdoers may be influenced to obey the law by their awareness of the
possibility of punishment. However, criminal punishments also serve to
express to law-abiding members of society that the society's values, as
codified in its criminal law, can and will be enforced through application of
that law.95
This facet of criminal prohibition and punishment is commonly termed
denunciation. Its role in criminal sentencing is "implicit in our laws,"
according to one commentator. 96  However, like other aspects of the
criminal law, it is prone to abuse. Just as the law overreaches when it
punishes conduct within the protected realm of individual liberty, it also
overreaches when it conveys to society that values unenforceable in the
criminal law are in fact protected by it. A society's disapproval of abortion
is such a value. However the society as a whole may feel about a woman's
choice to terminate her pregnancy, the Supreme Court has made clear that
94. Teen Guilty, supra note 2.
95. Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of
the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REv. 299, 331-332 (1990).
96. Michael H. Marcus, Sentencing in the Temple of Denunciation: Criminal
Justice's Weakest Link, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 671, 674 (2004).
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the U.S. Constitution vests that choice not in society, but in the pregnant
woman herself. When the state communicates through its use of criminal
punishment that society will not tolerate a pregnant woman's free choice, it
comes into conflict with the Constitution's protection of that liberty.
The Supreme Court previously considered the constitutional
significance of a state abortion law's expressive effects in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services.97 In that case, the Court addressed the
language of the preamble to a Missouri statute:
The Act's preamble, as noted, sets forth "findings" by the Missouri
Legislature that "[t]he life of each human being begins at
conception," and that "[u]nborn children have protectable interests
in life, health, and well-being." Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.205.1(1), (2)
(1986). The Act then mandates that state laws be interpreted to
provide unborn children with "all the rights, privileges, and
immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this
state," subject to the Constitution and this Court's precedents.98
The court of appeals had held that this language indicated the state's intent
to base the regulations contained within the act on the theory of when life
began.99 The court of appeals relied on language from a previous decision,
based on the holding of Roe, which asserted that a state could not justify its
abortion laws by adopting a particular theory regarding the beginnings of
life. 100 On this reasoning, it invalidated the Missouri statute.101
However, the Supreme Court found no basis for the lower court's
conclusion in the absence of an authoritative interpretation of the statute by
the Missouri courts. 10 2 The Court emphasized that the state was free to
make and express its own value judgments.10 3 It also interpreted the
language on which the court of appeals had relied, which, it emphasized,
had only been dicta, to mean only that an otherwise invalid regulation
would not be upheld because it embodied the state's theory of life. 104
This holding could be read to suggest that no basis exists for
invalidation of a statute's language when an impermissible prohibition is
not at issue. However, ample support exists for distinguishing the specific
holding of Webster from the issue I address here. In applying a criminal
prohibition, the state courts interpret the state's law, so a reviewing federal
court need not rely on its own speculative interpretation of state statutory
language. Furthermore, there is an important distinction between the
97. Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 499 (1989).
98. Id. at 504.
99. Id. at 504-505.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 506.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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holding that a state is permitted to express its own values and one that
allows the state to express the position that those values can and will be
enforced through the criminal justice system.
In my view, the application of Texas's Prenatal Protection Act to the
facts alleged by Mr. Flores does the latter. Though the state has legitimate
reasons for prohibiting the conduct at issue, it expresses through the terms
of its prohibition an entirely different purpose. It effectively states that,
notwithstanding the pregnant woman's choice, the taking of the fetus' lives
was itself unacceptable to society and that society has acted to enforce that
value. It has thereby not merely expressed the state's disapproval of a
woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy, but denied the existence of her
right to do so. To tell someone that her liberty does not exist may be to
effectively deprive her of it. The state's use of its statutory language to
effect an act of criminal punishment is therefore an expression of an
entirely different character than that assessed in Webster and should be
viewed as irreconcilable with Roe.
It is my conclusion, therefore, that courts and constitutional scholars
can and must concern themselves not merely with the conduct that a law
prohibits, or the punishment it imposes, but with the terms in which the law
expresses its prohibition. To call an abortion a homicide, based solely on
the state's permissible interest in the manner in which the abortion was
performed, is offensive to the Constitution and to the principles delineated
by the Roe and Casey decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
In view of this discussion, then, what should happen to Gerardo Flores,
or others convicted under similar circumstances? In my view, a conviction
for fetal homicide cannot stand where a jury has not found, beyond any
reasonable doubt, that the act resulting in the fetus's death was not solicited
by the pregnant woman herself in an effort to terminate her pregnancy. In
the Flores case, of course, this fact was controverted. An appellate court
might appropriately choose to remand the case for a new trial, in which the
jury is instructed appropriately. Alternately, defendants like Mr. Flores
may be convicted of violating other criminal laws with provisions and
penalties more accurately reflecting the justifications behind them. Any
such law must have as its central element the violation of state mandated
abortion procedures or the dangerousness of the committed act to the
pregnant woman herself.
At a time when the continued recognition of the right itself has been
called into question, there is, perhaps, something quixotic in arguing for
more thorough treatment of the fundamental right to an abortion when
considering a state law implicating that right.'0 5  Nonetheless, in the
105. At the time of this writing, South Dakota has just enacted a ban on all abortions,
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absence of an outright reversal of Roe, pro-choice advocates must remain
vigilant against efforts to chip away at the recognition of the fundamental
nature of the right as well as against more direct attacks.
Moreover, the principles illustrated by the foregoing discussion have
applicability beyond the abortion right alone. In general, I believe that a
basic awareness of any fundamental liberty interest must pervade any
analysis of state action pertaining to thatinterest, even where the state has
established the power to regulate. All state action pertaining to that
regulation must be consistent with a recognition of the liberty interest
involved. It is necessary that the basic nature of the regulations be justified
by permissible state interests under a level of scrutiny appropriate to the
nature of the liberty interest at stake, but consideration must not end there.
When a regulation is violated, the nature of the underlying right affects
which purported state interests do and do not justify punishment. In my
view, it also affects the terms in which the state may frame its regulation,
and the message it may seek to send via its enforcement.
The alternative, an approach which disregards essential liberties as
soon as a permissible role for state regulation is identified, threatens a
dangerous "boxing in" of our rights. It is a regime wherein any protection
accorded to our rights is treated as a narrow exception to the state's
otherwise free ranging power. It must be remembered that a fundamental
liberty interest is essential, not exceptional, lest the shadow of the state's
hand over its exercise have a dangerous chilling effect that ultimately
permits a perceptual leap to the viewpoint that our fundamental liberties are
only allowances granted to us by the state and not fundamental at all.
save those necessary to save the life of the mother, within the state. John Holusha, South
Dakota Governor Signs Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 6, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/06/politics/O6cnd-
abort.html?ex=1299301200&en=6bfae 1957bc ldc 1 a&ei=5088. The governor who signed
the bill into law has acknowledged that it is in direct conflict with the holding of Roe v.
Wade. Id. The bill "is in the forefront of an effort by abortion opponents to test whether a
more conservative Supreme Court will reconsider, and possibly reverse, the Roe decision."
Id.
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